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 Sloop illegaal gebouwd huis. Respect voor wo-
ning. Recht op eigendom. Individuele belan-
genafweging is alleen noodzakelijk onder  art. 8 
EVRM en niet onder  art. 1 Protocol 1 EVRM. 
Schending art. 8 EVRM. 
 Klagers, Mavruda Ivanova en Ivan Cherkezov, 
bouwden tussen 2005 en 2006 een huis in het dorp 
Sinemorets. Zij verlieten hun eerdere woning in 
de stad Burgas omdat de kosten daar voor hen te 
hoog waren. Ivanova heeft geen vaste baan en erfde 
een deel van grond waarop het huis is gebouwd. 
Cherkezov is sinds 2004 arbeidsongeschikt en ont-
vangt sinds 2005 een uitkering. Het huis werd ech-
ter gebouwd zonder de daarvoor benodigde bouw-
vergunning. Dit was een reden voor het bevoegde 
bestuursorgaan om te oordelen dat het afgebroken 
diende te worden. Tegen dit besluit procedeert Iva-
nova tot aan de hoogste rechter zonder succes. Deze 
oordeelt namelijk in zijn uitspraak van 17 maart 
2015, net als de lagere rechters, dat het huis gesloopt 
dient te worden aangezien het in strijd met de wet-
telijke eis om eerst een bouwvergunning te krijgen is 
gebouwd. Op de persoonlijke omstandigheden van 
klagers slaan het bevoegde bestuursorgaan noch de 
rechterlijke instanties acht. 
 Klagers stellen dat de beoogde sloop van hun 
woning in strijd is met  art. 8 EVRM en  art. 1 Protocol 
1 EVRM. 
 Het Hof overweegt ten eerste dat de sloop van 
het huis tot een inmenging in de door  art. 8 EVRM 
beschermde rechten van klagers als bewoners leidt. 
Het Hof overweegt vervolgens dat de sloop van de 
woning een legitiem doel dient, namelijk het be-
vorderen van ruimtelijke ordening en het economi-
sche welzijn van het land. Volgens het Hof laat het 
Bulgaarse juridische kader echter in strijd met art. 
8 EVRM geen ruimte voor een toets van de propor-
tionaliteit van het besluit tot sloop van de woning. 
Het Hof concludeert dat de sloop van de woning in 
strijd is met art. 8 EVRM, indien deze doorgang vindt 
zonder dat de proportionaliteit van het sloopbesluit 
in het licht van de persoonlijke omstandigheden van 
klagers is getoetst. 
 Ten aanzien van de vermeende schending van 
 art. 1 Protocol 1 EVRM overweegt het Hof dat sta-
ten een grote beoordelingsvrijheid hebben bij het 
reguleren van het eigendomsrecht in het kader van 
ruimtelijke ordening. Anders dan  art. 8 EVRM ver-
eist art. 1 Protocol 1 EVRM volgens het Hof daarom 
geen geïndividualiseerde toets van het sloopbesluit. 
Het Hof concludeert derhalve dat de sloop van de 
woning niet in strijd is met art. 1 Protocol 1 EVRM. 
 Ivanova en Cherkezov 
 tegen 
 Bulgarije 
 The law 
 I. Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention 
 45.  The applicants complained that the 
demolition of the house in which they live would 
be in breach of their right to respect for their 
home. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, 
which provides, in so far as relevant: 
 “1.  Everyone has the right to respect for 
… his home … 
 2.  There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the pro-
tection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 A. The parties' submissions 
 46.  The Government submitted that the de-
cision ordering the demolition of the house in 
which the applicants lived was lawful. It had been 
judicially reviewed and upheld. It was also neces-
sary for the protection of public safety. The natio-
nal authorities had a wide margin of appreciation 
to tackle the problem of illegal construction. The 
impossibility to legalise unlawful buildings had 
been put in place in view of the strong public in-
terest to ensure the safety, hygiene and aesthetics 
of construction. The demolition of a building be-
cause it had been erected without a permit was a 
proportionate measure required in all cases and 
not capable of being eschewed at the discretion 
of the building control authorities. Those authori-
ties had acted straight away when apprised of the 
illegality of the house inhabited by the applicants, 
and had not tolerated an illegal situation for a 
long time: the applicants had started inhabiting 
the house at the earliest in 2009 and the demoli-
tion procedure had started in 2011. The applicants 
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had constructed the house knowing full well that 
they had not obtained the required permit. All 
such buildings, unless falling under the transi-
tional amnesty provisions of the 2001 Act, were 
subject to demolition; the courts had inquired 
into that point in the applicants' case. The autho-
rities had allowed the first applicant to comment 
on the intended demolition, and had invited her 
to comply with the demolition order of her own 
accord. In as much as she argued that she had no 
other place to live, it had to be noted that in June 
2013, after the beginning of the demolition pro-
ceedings, she had donated a flat that she owned 
in Burgas and that, although the authorities did 
not have an obligation to provide the applicants, 
who did not belong to a particularly vulnerable 
group, with alternative accommodation, they had 
explored the possibility of settling them in a mu-
nicipal flat. The second applicant was in receipt of 
a sufficiently high pension and the first applicant 
was able to work. They could thus afford to pay 
market rent in Sinemorets, and their personal 
circumstances were not as dire as they sought to 
paint them. The authorities had endeavoured to 
take all these matters into account when sending 
a social worker to interview the first applicant. It 
was equally possible to have the proportionality 
of the demolition reviewed in proceedings under 
Article 278 of the Code of Administrative Proce-
dure 2006. The interference with the applicants' 
right to respect for their home was therefore pro-
portionate. Article 8 of the Convention could not 
be construed as precluding the enforcement of 
the building regulations in respect of those who 
sought to flout them, or as requiring the authori-
ties to provide persons in the applicants' situation 
with a place to live. 
 47.  The applicants submitted that they had 
lived in the house undisturbed for nearly seven 
years, even though the local authorities were fully 
aware that it had been constructed without a per-
mit, as the applicants had paid taxes in respect of 
the house and had their address registration the-
re, and as Sinemorets was a small village. It was 
moreover widely known that many buildings in 
villages and small towns in Bulgaria had been 
constructed without a permit. The Ombudsman 
of the Republic had commented on that, saying 
that the authorities did not systematically com-
bat illegal construction and had to do so pre-
emptively rather than  ex post facto . In spite of 
that recommendation, the only way of dealing 
with illegal buildings envisaged by the law was 
their demolition. The applicants were particu-
larly vulnerable because the second applicant 
was handicapped and had a small pension, and 
the first applicant had been unemployed since 
2003. The only illegality affecting the house was 
that it had been constructed without a permit; it 
otherwise fully complied with the applicable re-
gulations. The public interest did not require its 
demolition, which would result in rendering two 
elderly persons with health problems homeless. 
The rules governing the demolition of buildings 
constructed without a permit, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Administrative Court, did not en-
visage any proportionality assessment or a proce-
dure affording proper guarantees in that respect, 
and did not leave any discretion to the competent 
authorities, which were required to enforce them 
regardless of individual circumstances. 
 B. The Court's assessment 
 1. Admissibility 
 48.  The complaint is not manifestly ill-foun-
ded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the 
Convention or inadmissible on other grounds. It 
must therefore be declared admissible. 
 2. Merits 
 49.  Although only the first applicant has 
legal rights to the house, both applicants have 
in fact lived in it for a number of years (see pa-
ragraphs 8 and 11 above). It is therefore ‘home’ 
for both of them (see, among other authorities, 
 Buckley v. the United Kingdom , 25 September 
1996, § 54,  Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1996-IV;  Prokopovich v. Russia , no. 58255/00, 
§ 36–39, ECHR 2004-XI (extracts);  McCann v. the 
United Kingdom , no. 19009/04, § 46, ECHR 2008; 
 Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 25446/06, 
§ 102–03, 24 April 2012; and  Winterstein and 
Others v. France , no. 27013/07, § 141, 17 October 
2013), and the order for its demolition amounts 
to an interference with their right to respect for 
that home (see,  mutatis mutandis, Ćosić v. Croatia , 
no. 28261/06, § 18, 15 January 2009;  Yordanova 
and Others , cited above, § 104; and  Winterstein 
and Others , cited above, § 143). 
 50.  The interference was lawful. The demoli-
tion order had a clear legal basis in section 225(2)
(2) of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001 (see 
paragraphs 12 and 26 above). It was upheld, fol-
lowing fully adversarial proceedings, by two le-
vels of court (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above), 
and there is nothing to suggest that it was not 
otherwise ‘in accordance with the law’ within the 
meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. 
 51.  The Court is satisfied that the demolition 
would pursue a legitimate aim. Even if its only 
purpose is to ensure the effective implementa-
tion of the regulatory requirement that no buil-
dings can be constructed without permit, it may 
be regarded as seeking to re-establish the rule 
of law (see,  mutatis mutandis, Saliba v. Malta , no. 
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4251/02, § 44, 8 November 2005), which, in the 
context under examination, may be regarded as 
falling under ‘prevention of disorder’ and as pro-
moting the ‘economic well-being of the country’. 
This is particularly relevant for Bulgaria, where 
the problem of illegal construction appears to be 
rife (see paragraphs 41–43 above). 
 52.  Thus, the salient issue is whether the 
demolition would be ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’. On this point, the case bears considerable 
resemblance with cases concerning the eviction 
of tenants from public housing (see  McCann , ci-
ted above;  Ćosić , cited above;  Paulić v. Croatia , 
no. 3572/06, 22 October 2009;  Kay and Others v. 
the United Kingdom , no. 37341/06, 21 Septem-
ber 2010;  Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine , no. 
30856/03, 2 December 2010;  Igor Vasilchenko v. 
Russia , no. 6571/04, 3 February 2011; and  Bjedov 
v. Croatia , no. 42150/09, 29 May 2012), and cases 
concerning the eviction of occupiers from publi-
cly owned land (see  Chapman v. the United King-
dom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001-I;  Connors v. 
the United Kingdom , no. 66746/01, 27 May 2004; 
 Yordanova and Others , cited above;  Buckland v. 
the United Kingdom , no. 40060/08, 18 September 
2012; and  Winterstein and Others v. France , no. 
27013/07, 17 October 2013). An analogy may also 
be drawn with cases concerning evictions from 
properties previously owned by the applicants 
but lost by them as a result of civil proceedings 
brought by a private person, civil proceedings 
brought by a public body, or tax enforcement pro-
ceedings (see, respectively,  Zehentner v. Austria , 
no. 20082/02, 16 July 2009 (proceedings brought 
by a creditor);  Brežec v. Croatia , no. 7177/10, 18 
July 2013 (proceedings brought by the true ow-
ner of the premises);  Gladysheva v. Russia , no. 
7097/10, 6 December 2011 (proceedings brought 
by a municipal body); and  Rousk v. Sweden , no. 
27183/04, 25 July 2013 (tax enforcement pro-
ceedings)). 
 53.  Under the court's well-established case-
law, as expounded in those judgments, the as-
sessment of the necessity of the interference in 
cases concerning the loss of one's home for the 
promotion of a public interest involves not only 
issues of substance but also a question of pro-
cedure: whether the decision-making process 
was such as to afford due respect to the interests 
protected under Article 8 of the Convention (see 
 Connors , § 83;  McCann , § 49;  Kay and Others , § 67; 
 Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy , § 44; and  Yordanova and 
Others , § 118 (iii), all cited above). Since the loss 
of one's home is a most extreme form of interfe-
rence with the right to respect for the home, any 
person risking this — whether or not belonging 
to a vulnerable group — should in principle be 
able to have the proportionality of the measure 
determined by an independent tribunal in the 
light of the relevant principles under that Arti-
cle (see, among other authorities,  McCann , § 50; 
 Ćosić , § 22;  Zehentner , § 59;  Kay and Others , § 68; 
 Buckland , § 65; and  Rousk , § 137, all cited above). 
The factors likely to be of prominence in this re-
gard, when it comes to illegal construction, are 
whether or not the home was established unlaw-
fully, whether or not the persons concerned did 
so knowingly, what is the nature and degree of 
the illegality at issue, what is the precise nature of 
the interest sought to be protected by the demoli-
tion, and whether suitable alternative accommo-
dation is available to the persons affected by the 
demolition (see  Chapman , cited above, § 102–04). 
Another factor could be whether there are less se-
vere ways of dealing with the case; the list is not 
exhaustive. Therefore, if the person concerned 
contests the proportionality of the interference on 
the basis of such arguments, the courts must exa-
mine them carefully and give adequate reasons in 
relation to them (see  Yordanova and Others , § 118 
(iv)  in fine , and  Winterstein and Others , § 148 (δ) 
 in fine , both cited above); the interference cannot 
normally be regarded as justified simply because 
the case falls under a rule formulated in gene-
ral and absolute terms. The mere possibility of 
obtaining judicial review of the administrative 
decision causing the loss of the home is thus 
not enough; the person concerned must be able 
to challenge that decision on the ground that it 
is disproportionate in view of his or her perso-
nal circumstances (see  McCann , § 51–55;  Ćosić , 
§ 21–23; and  Kay and Others , § 69–74, all cited 
above). Naturally, if in such proceedings the nati-
onal courts have regard to all relevant factors and 
weigh the competing interests in line with the 
above principles — in other words, where there 
is no reason to doubt the procedure followed in a 
given case — the margin of appreciation allowed 
to those courts will be a wide one, in recognition 
of the fact that they are better placed than an in-
ternational court to evaluate local needs and con-
ditions, and the Court will be reluctant to gainsay 
their assessment (see  Pinnock and Walker v. the 
United Kingdom (dec.), no. 31673/11, § 28–34, 24 
September 2013). 
 54.  The Court cannot agree with the posi-
tion, expressed by some Bulgarian administra-
tive courts, that the balance between the rights 
of those who stand to lose their homes and the 
public interest to ensure the effective implemen-
tation of the building regulations can as a rule 
properly be struck by way of an absolute rule per-
mitting of no exceptions (see paragraphs 26 and 
37 above). Such an approach could be sustained 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which gives the 
national authorities considerable latitude in dea-
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tire focus of those proceedings, in which the first 
applicant sought judicial review of the demo-
lition order — the second applicant, not having 
any property rights over the house and not being 
an addressee of the order, would not have even 
had standing to take part in them (see paragraph 
26  in fine above) — was whether the house had 
been built without a permit and whether it was 
nevertheless exempt from demolition because 
it fell within the transitional amnesty provisions 
of the relevant statute (see paragraphs 14 and 16 
above). In her appeal, the first applicant raised, 
albeit briefly, the points that the applicants now 
put before the Court: that the house was her only 
home and that she would be severely affected by 
its demolition (see paragraph 15 above). The Su-
preme Administrative Court did not even menti-
on, let alone substantively engage with this point 
(see,  mutatis mutandis ,  Brežec , cited above, § 49). 
This is hardly surprising, as under Bulgarian law 
it is not relevant for the demolition order's law-
fulness. Under the applicable statutory provisi-
ons, as construed by the Supreme Administrative 
Court, any building constructed without a permit 
is subject to demolition, unless it falls under the 
transitional amnesty provisions of the 2001 Act, 
and it is not open to the administrative authori-
ties to refrain from demolishing it on the basis 
that this would cause disproportionate harm to 
those affected by that measure (see paragraphs 
25–27 above). 
 57.  The possibility, adverted to by the Govern-
ment (see paragraphs 46 above and 78 below), 
to seek postponement of the enforcement of the 
demolition order under Article 278 of the Code of 
Administrative Procedure 2006 (see paragraph 31 
above) could not have remedied that (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, Paulić , § 44, and  Bjedov , § 71, both cited 
above). All the applicants could have obtained in 
proceedings under that provision — which are 
conducted solely before the administrative en-
forcement authority rather than an independent 
tribunal, with no possibility for judicial review of 
the decisions taken in their course — would have 
been a temporary reprieve from the effects of the 
demolition order rather than a comprehensive 
examination of its proportionality (see paragraph 
32 above). 
 58.  Nor does it appear that, as suggested by 
the Supreme Administrative Court in its judg-
ment of 1 June 2015 in a similar case (see para-
graph 30 above), it would have been possible, as 
matters stand, to obtain a proper examination of 
the proportionality of the demolition by seeking 
judicial review of the enforcement of the demo-
lition order under Article 294  et seq. of the 2006 
Code (see paragraph 35 above). Such examination 
could in principle be carried out in proceedings 
ling with illegal construction (see paragraphs 73–
76 below), or in other contexts (see  Animal Defen-
ders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 
48876/08, § 106–09, ECHR 2013 (extracts), with 
further references). But given that the right to 
respect for one's home under Article 8 of the Con-
vention touches upon issues of central importan-
ce to the individual's physical and moral integrity, 
maintenance of relationships with others and a 
settled and secure place in the community, the 
balancing exercise under that provision in cases 
where the interference consists in the loss of a 
person's only home is of a different order, with 
particular significance attaching to the extent of 
the intrusion into the personal sphere of those 
concerned (see  Connors , cited above, § 82). This 
can normally only be examined case by case. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Bulga-
rian legislature has given active consideration 
to this balance, or that in opting for a wholesale 
rather than a more narrowly tailored solution it 
has taken into account the interests protected 
under Article 8 of the Convention (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], 
nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 89, ECHR 2013 
(extracts), and contrast,  mutatis mutandis, Animal 
Defenders International , cited above, § 114–16). On 
the contrary, the Ombudsman of the Republic has 
repeatedly expressed concern in that regard (see 
paragraphs 41–43 above). 
 55.  Nor can the Court accept the suggestion 
that the possibility for those concerned to chal-
lenge the demolition of their homes by reference 
to Article 8 of the Convention would seriously 
undermine the system of building control in Bul-
garia (see paragraph 37 above). It is true that the 
relaxation of an absolute rule may entail risks of 
abuse, uncertainty or arbitrariness in the appli-
cation of the law, expense, and delay. But it can 
surely be expected that the competent adminis-
trative authorities and the administrative courts, 
which routinely deal with various claims relating 
to the demolition of illegal buildings (see para-
graphs 26, 27, 34 and 37–39 above), and have re-
cently showed that they can examine such claims 
in the light of Article 8 of the Convention (see 
paragraph 30 above), will be able to tackle those 
risks, especially if they are assisted in this task by 
appropriate parameters or guidelines. Moreover, 
it would only be in exceptional cases that those 
concerned would succeed in raising an arguable 
claim that demolition would be disproportionate 
in their particular circumstances (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, McCann , § 54;  Paulić , § 43; and  Bjedov , 
§ 67, all cited above). 
 56.  The proceedings conducted in this case 
did not meet the above-mentioned procedural 
requirements, as set out in paragraph 53. The en-
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capable of resulting in a comprehensive review of 
the proportionality of the demolition (see,  muta-
tis mutandis, Yordanova and Others , cited above, 
§ 136–37). In any event, even though the first 
applicant stated that she was not interested in 
social services, the Government emphasised that 
the authorities had no obligation to provide the 
applicants with alternative accommodation and 
did not clearly explain in what way those services 
would have provided the applicants with a satis-
factory solution. 
 61.  In sum, the applicants did not have at 
their disposal a procedure enabling them to ob-
tain a proper review of the proportionality of the 
intended demolition of the house in which they 
live in the light of their personal circumstances. 
 62.  The Court therefore finds that there 
would be a breach of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion if the order for the demolition of the house 
in which the applicants live were to be enforced 
without such review. 
 II. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 
1 
 63.  The first applicant further complained 
that the demolition of the house, part of which 
belonged to her, would be a disproportionate 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of her 
possessions. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1, which provides as follows: 
 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the condi-
tions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
 The preceding provisions shall not, however, 
in any way impair the right of a State to en-
force such laws as it deems necessary to con-
trol the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment 
of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 A. The parties' submissions 
 64.  The Government submitted that the 
complaint was incompatible  ratione personae 
with the provisions of Protocol No. 1 in so far as 
the second applicant was concerned, because 
only the first applicant had title to the house. 
Moreover, in as much as the house had been il-
legally constructed without being tolerated by 
the authorities for a long time, it could not be 
regarded as a ‘possession’ within the meaning 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the alternative, 
the Government submitted that the interference 
with the first applicant's possessions was jus-
tified. The demolition, which was a measure of 
control of property, was lawful and would not 
for judicial review of enforcement (see  J.L. v. the 
United Kingdom (dec.), no. 66387/10, § 44–46, 
30 September 2014). But the case-law under 
these provisions shows that the Bulgarian ad-
ministrative courts generally decline to examine 
arguments relating to the individual situation of 
the persons concerned by the demolition. They 
do so either on the basis that the proper balance 
between their rights under Article 8 of the Con-
vention and the countervailing public interest 
to combat illegal construction has been resolved 
at the legislative level and that demolition is the 
only means of tackling illegal construction, or 
that such points can only be examined in pro-
ceedings for judicial review of the demolition or-
der itself (see paragraphs 37–39 above). The only 
court that appears to have shown some willing-
ness to entertain such arguments in proceedings 
under Article 294  et seq. of the Code is the Pa-
zardzhik Administrative Court, which however 
did so when imposing interim measures in such 
proceedings rather than when dealing with the 
merits of the cases (see paragraph 40 above). It 
is also unclear whether persons in the position of 
the second applicant, who is not the addressee of 
the demolition order and has no property rights 
over the house, would have standing to bring 
such a challenge (see paragraph 36 above). 
 59.  The applicants could not have obtained a 
proper examination of the proportionality of the 
demolition by bringing a claim for declaratory 
judgment under Article 292 of the 2006 Code 
either (see paragraph 33 above). The case-law 
under that provision, which is only intended to 
prevent the enforcement of administrative deci-
sions where newly emerged facts militate against 
it, shows that in such proceedings the Bulgarian 
administrative courts just check whether facts 
which have come to pass after the issuing or the 
demolition order or its upholding by the courts 
— such as a lapse of the limitation period for en-
forcement or an intervening legalisation of the 
building — could preclude enforcement (see pa-
ragraph 34 above). There appears to be no case in 
which the courts have allowed such a claim, and 
thus blocked the enforcement of a demolition 
order, on the basis of arguments relating to the 
personal circumstances of those concerned. Mo-
reover, in the applicants' case the enforcement 
proceedings started less than one month after the 
demolition order was upheld by the courts (see 
paragraphs 16 and 17 above). 
 60.  The involvement of the social services, 
which only occurred after notice of the applica-
tion had been given to the Government (see pa-
ragraph 21 above), could not make good the lack 
of a proper proportionality assessment. It did not 
take place within the framework of a procedure 
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inadmissible on other grounds. It must therefore 
be declared admissible. 
 3. Merits 
 68.  Since in Bulgaria it is settled law that ille-
gal buildings can be the objects of the right to pro-
perty, and since the Burgas Regional Court held 
that the first applicant is the owner of 484.43 out 
of the 625 shares of both the plot and the house 
built on it (see paragraph 9 above), there can be 
no doubt that she has a ‘possession’ and that Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable. 
 69.  The intended demolition of the house 
will in turn amount to an interference with the 
first applicant's possessions (see  Allard v. Sweden , 
no. 35179/97, § 50, ECHR 2003-VII, and  Hamer v. 
Belgium , no. 21861/03, § 77, ECHR 2007-V (ex-
tracts)). Being meant to ensure compliance with 
the general rules concerning the prohibitions 
on construction, this interference amounts to a 
‘control [of] the use of property’ (see  Hamer , ci-
ted above, § 77, and  Saliba , cited above, § 35). It 
therefore falls to be examined under the second 
paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 70.  The demolition order had a clear legal 
basis in section 225(2)(2) of the Territorial Organi-
sation Act 2001 (see paragraphs 12 and 26 above). 
It was upheld, following fully adversarial pro-
ceedings, by two levels of court (see paragraphs 14 
and 16 above). The interference is therefore lawful 
for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 71.  It can also be accepted that the interfe-
rence, which seeks to ensure compliance with 
the building regulations, is ‘in accordance with 
the general interest’ (see  Saliba , cited above, § 44). 
At the same time, it should be noted that the 
demolition order, although the product of a de-
nunciation by the first applicant's co-owners (see 
paragraph 11 above), was not premised on the 
first applicant's failure to obtain their assent for 
the construction of the house. It cannot therefore 
be regarded as intended to protect their interests 
(contrast  Allard , cited above, § 52). It follows that 
the weight of those interests is not a pertinent 
consideration in this case (contrast  Allard , cited 
above, § 60). 
 72.  The salient issue is whether the inter-
ference would strike a fair balance between the 
first applicant's interest to keep her possessions 
intact and the general interest to ensure effective 
implementation of the prohibition against buil-
ding without a permit. 
 73.  According to the court's settled case-law, 
the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 must be read in the light of the principle set 
out in the first sentence of the first paragraph: 
that an interference needs to strike a fair balance 
between the general interest of the community 
impose an excessive burden on the applicants as 
their financial situation, as evident from the pro-
perty disposal transactions carried out by them, 
was not so dire, and as they had wilfully acted in 
defiance of the law. Moreover, the house did not 
exclusively belong to the first applicant; the other 
co-owners of the plot were entitled to a share of 
it, and some of them had objected to its construc-
tion. The legitimate aim sought to be achieved by 
the demolition was to enforce the building regu-
lations, which required a permit for each newly 
constructed building. In constructing the house 
without a permit, the applicants had knowingly 
acted in breach of the law and had disregarded 
the other co-owners' interests. 
 65.  The applicants submitted that the com-
plaint had only been raised by the first applicant, 
who had legal rights over the house even though 
it had been illegally constructed. It was therefore 
a ‘possession’. Nothing would be achieved by 
demolishing it. It would not benefit the other co-
owners of the plot, who had displayed no wish 
to take care of the property and whose interests 
would be better served if they were allotted a 
share of the house. Nor would it advance the pu-
blic interest, which could be vindicated by less in-
vasive measures, such as a financial penalty. The 
applicants had built the house to have a place to 
live when they grew old. In 2005 the first appli-
cant had approached one of the other co-owners 
to obtain his assent to the construction, but he 
had tried to wring a disproportionate amount of 
money out of her in exchange for that. That was 
why the applicants had proceeded with the con-
struction without obtaining a permit. 
 B. The court's assessment 
 1. Scope of the complaint ratione personae 
 66.  It should be noted at the outset that this 
complaint was only raised by the first applicant. 
It is therefore not necessary to rule on the Govern-
ment's objection in relation to the second appli-
cant. 
 2. Admissibility 
 67.  The parties have diverging views on 
whether the first applicant has a ‘possession’ wit-
hin the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and 
whether that provision is thus applicable. But in 
this case it is more appropriate to examine this 
question on the merits (see,  mutatis mutandis, 
Depalle v. France (dec.), no. 34044/02, 29 April 
2008, and  Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), 
no. 25446/06, 14 September 2010). The com-
plaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the 
meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or 
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regarded the requirements of the law. The order 
and its enforcement will also serve to deter other 
potential lawbreakers (see  Saliba , cited above, 
§ 46), which must not be discounted in view of 
the apparent pervasiveness of the problem of il-
legal construction in Bulgaria (see paragraphs 
41-43 above). In view of the wide margin of ap-
preciation that the Bulgarian authorities enjoy 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in choosing 
both the means of enforcement and in ascertai-
ning whether the consequences of enforcement 
would be justified, none of the above considera-
tions can be outweighed by the first applicant's 
proprietary interest in the house. 
 76.  The implementation of the demolition 
order would therefore not be in breach of the first 
applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 III. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Con-
vention 
 77.  The applicants complained that they did 
not have an effective domestic remedy in respect 
of their complaint under Article 8 of the Conven-
tion. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, 
which provides as follows: 
 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in [the] Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.” 
 A. The parties' submissions 
 78.  The Government submitted that the ap-
plicants could have sought postponement of the 
enforcement of the demolition order under Arti-
cle 278 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 
2006 on the basis of arguments relating to their 
financial situation and the impossibility to ob-
tain alternative accommodation. That did not of 
course mean that the authorities had an uncon-
ditional obligation to provide them such accom-
modation. That said, there was no evidence that 
the applicants had taken steps to be settled in a 
municipal flat. 
 79.  The applicants submitted that a request 
under Article 278 of the 2006 Code was not an 
effective remedy. All it could achieve was a short 
postponement of the enforcement. The law did 
not envisage any way of dealing with unlawful 
construction other than its demolition, regardless 
of the degree or nature of the illegality, or the ef-
fects of the measure on the personal situation of 
those affected by it. 
 B. The Court's assessment 
 80.  The complaint is not manifestly ill-foun-
ded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the 
and the individual's rights. This means that a 
measure must be both appropriate for achieving 
its aim and not disproportionate to that aim (see, 
among other authorities,  James and Others v. the 
United Kingdom , 21 February 1986, § 50, Series 
A no. 98). However, the High Contracting Parties 
enjoy a margin of appreciation in this respect, in 
particular in choosing the means of enforcement 
and in ascertaining whether the consequences of 
enforcement would be justified (see, as a recent 
authority,  Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, 
§ 83, ECHR 2010). When it comes to the imple-
mentation of their spatial planning and property 
development policies, this margin is wide (see 
 Saliba , cited above, § 45, with further references). 
 74.  For that reason, unlike Article 8 of the 
Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not 
in such cases presuppose the availability of a pro-
cedure requiring an individualised assessment of 
the necessity of each measure of implementation 
of the relevant planning rules. It is not contrary 
to the latter for the legislature to lay down broad 
and general categories rather than provide for a 
scheme whereby the proportionality of a mea-
sure of implementation is to be examined in each 
individual case (see  James and Others , cited above, 
§ 68, and  Allen and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(dec.), no. 5591/07, § 66, 6 October 2009). There 
is no incongruity in this, as the intensity of the 
interests protected under those two Articles, and 
the resultant margin of appreciation enjoyed 
by the national authorities under each of them, 
are not necessarily co-extensive (see  Connors , 
cited above, § 82). Thus, although the Court has 
in some cases assessed the proportionality of a 
measure under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the 
light of largely the same factors as those that it 
has taken into account under Article 8 of the Con-
vention (see  Zehentner , § 52–65 and 70–79;  Gla-
dysheva , § 64–83 and 90–97; and  Rousk , § 108-27 
and 134–42, all cited above, as well as  Demades v. 
Turkey , no. 16219/90, § 36–37 and 44–46, 31 July 
2003), this assessment is not inevitably identical 
in all circumstances. 
 75.  In the first applicant's case, the house 
was knowingly built without a permit (contrast 
 N.A. and Others v. Turkey , no. 37451/97, § 39  in 
fine , ECHR 2005-X, and  Depalle , cited above, § 85), 
and therefore in flagrant breach of the domestic 
building regulations. In this case, regardless of 
the explanations that the first applicant gave for 
this failure, this can be regarded as a crucial con-
sideration under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The 
order that the house be demolished, which was 
issued a reasonable time after its construction 
(contrast  Hamer , cited above, § 83), simply seeks 
to put things back in the position in which they 
would have been if the first applicant had not dis-
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fact be paid by the BHC; and that the representa-
tive agreed that any award in respect of costs and 
expenses could be made payable to the BHC. The 
applicants also submitted a time-sheet and postal 
receipts. 
 87.  The Government disputed the number of 
hours spent by the applicants' legal representa-
tive on the case, saying that they were excessive 
in view of its low complexity and the length of 
the submissions that she had made on the ap-
plicants' behalf. The sum claimed in that respect 
was many times higher than those envisaged for 
similar work in domestic proceedings and out of 
tune with economic realities in the country. The 
Government also pointed out that there was no 
evidence, such as an invoice or a payment docu-
ment, showing that the BHC had actually paid any 
remuneration to the applicants' representative. 
 88.  According to the court's settled case-law, 
costs and expenses are recoverable under Article 
41 of the Convention if it is established that they 
were actually and necessarily incurred and are 
reasonable as to quantum. 
 89.  The first point in dispute was whether 
the costs claimed by the applicants were actually 
incurred. The applicants made an agreement with 
their representative and the BHC that is compa-
rable to a contingency fee agreement whereby 
a client agrees to remunerate his lawyer only in 
the event of a successful outcome of the case. If 
legally enforceable, such agreements may show 
that the sums claimed are payable and there-
fore actually incurred (see  Kamasinski v. Austria , 
19 December 1989, § 115, Series A no. 168). This 
being the case in Bulgaria (see paragraph 44 
above, and compare  Saghatelyan v. Armenia , no. 
7984/06, § 62, 20 October 2015, and contrast 
 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (Article 50), 24 
February 1983, § 22, Series A no. 59, and  Pshe-
nichnyy v. Russia , no. 30422/03, § 38, 14 February 
2008), the Court accepts that the costs claimed 
were actually incurred by the applicants, even if 
for the time being no payments have taken place. 
 90.  The second disputed point was whether 
the costs were reasonable as to quantum. 
The Court is not bound by domestic scales or 
standards in that assessment (see  Dimitrov and 
Others v. Bulgaria , no. 77938/11, § 190, 1 July 2014, 
with further references). It simply notes that the 
hourly rate charged by the applicants' represen-
tative is comparable to that charged in a recent 
case against Bulgaria involving similar issues (see 
 Yordanova and Others , cited above, § 172). It can 
thus be regarded as reasonable. However, having 
regard to the submissions made on behalf of the 
applicants, the Court finds that the number of 
hours claimed is excessive. 
Convention or inadmissible on other grounds. It 
must therefore be declared admissible. 
 81.  However, in as much as the finding of a 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention was pre-
mised on the absence of a procedure in which 
the applicants could challenge the demolition 
of the house on proportionality grounds (see pa-
ragraphs 56-61 above), no separate issue arises 
under Article 13 of the Convention (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, Stanková v. Slovakia , no. 7205/02, § 67, 
9 October 2007, and  Yordanova and Others , cited 
above, § 152). 
 IV. Application of Article 41 of the Convention 
 82.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
 “If the Court finds that there has been a violati-
on of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting 
Party concerned allows only partial reparation 
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford 
just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
 A. Damage 
 83.  The applicants jointly claimed € 2,000 in 
respect of the distress experienced by them as a 
result of the alleged breaches of Articles 8 and 13 
of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 84.  The Government submitted that the 
claim was exorbitant. 
 85.  In this case, the award of compensation 
can only be based on the breach of Article 8 of the 
Convention. However, that breach will only take 
place if the decision ordering the demolition of 
the house in which the applicants live were to be 
enforced, which has for the time being not hap-
pened (see paragraph 22 above). The finding of 
a violation is therefore sufficient just satisfaction 
for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the 
applicants (see  Yordanova and Others , cited above, 
§ 171). 
 B. Costs and expenses 
 86.  The applicants claimed € 3,280 in respect 
of forty-one hours of work by their legal repre-
sentative on the proceedings before the Court, 
billed at € 80 per hour, plus € 13.73 for postage. 
They requested than any award made under this 
head be made payable to the BHC, with which 
their legal representative worked (see paragraph 
2 above). In support of this claim, the applicants 
submitted two agreements between them, their 
legal representative and the BHC in which it 
was stipulated that the applicants did not have 
to pay any remuneration to their representative 
up-front but that the representative would claim 
her fees, plus any related expenses, in the event 
of a successful outcome of the case; that, in the 
event of a successful outcome, the fees would in 
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 Noot 
 1. Deze uitspraak ondersteunt de in de ju-
risprudentie van bestuursrechters waarneem-
bare tendens om de intensiteit van de toetsing 
van de proportionaliteit van een besluit mede te 
laten afhangen van de zwaarte van het belang dat 
in het geding is (vgl. E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin,  Dyna-
miek in de bestuursrechtspraak , VAR-Preadvies, 
Den Haag 2015; T. Barkhuysen, Een revolutie in 
het bestuursrecht?,  NJB 2015/1137 met verwijzin-
gen). Kort en goed oordeelt het Hof dat wanneer 
een zeer fundamenteel recht als het recht op een 
woning als bedoeld in  art. 8 EVRM in het geding 
is, er steeds een individuele proportionaliteits-
toets (ook in geval de betrokkenen niet behoren 
tot een kwetsbare groep) door een onafhankelijke 
instantie moet plaatsvinden. Dit in contrast met 
het eigendomsrecht van art. 1 Protocol 1 EVRM 
dat in zaken als de onderhavige, die de gedwon-
gen sloop van illegaal gebouwde woningen be-
treffen, wel ruimte laat voor een algemene regel 
waarop geen uitzonderingen mogelijk zijn in-
houdende dat er hoe dan ook gehandhaafd moet 
worden. Deze uitspraak past ook bij de tendens 
van het afleiden van procedurele rechten uit ma-
teriële bepalingen (in casu art. 8 EVRM), die zich 
in een groeiende populariteit mag verheugen. Dit 
impliceert wel dat het Hof in deze uitspraak geen 
uitsluitsel geeft over de vraag of de sloop nu al 
dan niet is toegestaan. Dat is uiteindelijk aan de 
Bulgaarse autoriteiten (het huis was hangende de 
procedure nog niet gesloopt). 
 2. Interessant is in dat laatste verband dat 
het Hof in r.o. 53 een serie met niet limitatief 
bedoelde gezichtspunten meegeeft voor de be-
trokken nationale instantie die een rol moeten 
spelen bij die individuele toets: of de woning al 
bij de oprichting illegaal was, of de illegale op-
richting al dan niet bewust gebeurde, de aard en 
zwaarte van het illegale karakter, het belang dat 
is gemoeid met sloop, of er geschikte alternatieve 
woonruimte beschikbaar is en of er minder ver-
gaande alternatieven voor sloop aanwezig zijn. 
Deze factoren moeten door de betrokken instan-
tie zorgvuldig onderzocht worden en van een ge-
motiveerde reactie worden voorzien waarbij al-
gemene handhavingsregels niet bepalend mogen 
zijn en persoonlijke omstandigheden meewegen. 
Als er langs deze lijnen een zorgvuldige toets door 
de nationale instantie plaatsvindt, geldt ten aan-
zien van de uitkomst daarvan een ruime beoor-
delingsvrijheid wanneer het EHRM deze toetst. 
Het Hof verwerpt de tegenwerping van de Bul-
gaarse regering dat daarmee de effectiviteit van 
de handhaving wordt ondergraven. Het louter 
vanwege het illegale karakter besluiten tot sloop 
kan aldus niet door de beugel, er moet een nadere 
 91.  Taking into account all these points and 
the materials in its possession, the Court awards 
the applicants a total of € 2,013.73, plus any tax 
that may be chargeable to them. 
 92.  As requested by the applicants, this sum 
is to be paid directly to the BHC, with which their 
representative works. The court's practice has 
been to accede to such requests (see  Neshkov 
and Others v. Bulgaria , nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 
72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 
§ 309, 27 January 2015, with further references). 
 C. Default interest 
 93.  The Court considers it appropriate that 
the default interest rate should be based on the 
marginal lending rate of the European Central 
Bank, to which should be added three percentage 
points. 
 For these reasons, the Court, 
 1.  Declares , unanimously, the application 
admissible; 
 2.  Holds , by six votes to one, that there 
would be a violation of Article 8 of the Conven-
tion if the order for the demolition of the house 
in which the applicants live were to be enforced 
without a proper review of its proportionality in 
the light of the applicants' personal circumstan-
ces; 
 3.  Holds , unanimously, that there would be 
no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 if the 
order for the demolition of the house were to be 
enforced; 
 4.  Holds , unanimously, that there is no need 
to examine the complaint under Article 13 of the 
Convention; 
 5.  Holds , by six votes to one, 
 (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the 
applicants, within three months from the date on 
which the judgment becomes final in accordance 
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, € 2,013.73 
(two thousand thirteen euros and seventy-three 
cents), to be converted into the currency of the 
respondent State at the rate applicable at the 
date of settlement, plus any tax that may be char-
geable to the applicants, in respect of costs and 
expenses, to be paid to the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee; 
 (b)  that from the expiry of the above-men-
tioned three months until settlement simple in-
terest shall be payable on the above amount at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the 
European Central Bank during the default period 
plus three percentage points; 
 6.  Dismisses , unanimously, the remainder of 
the applicants' claim for just satisfaction. 
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gehandeld, zowel waar het heeft geacteerd op basis 
van enkel de gegevens uit het kentekenregister […], 
als in het kader van de tenuitvoerlegging van de gij-
zeling […]. Daarnaast zou de Staat ‘als registerhou-
der van het kentekenregister’ onrechtmatig jegens 
hem hebben gehandeld door niet te waarborgen 
dat het register de juiste gegevens bevat, door deze 
gegevens vervolgens zonder verificatie aan andere 
overheidsinstanties te verstrekken en bovendien te 
weigeren tot correctie van dat register (met terug-
werkende kracht) over te gaan. 
 De Staat beroept zich op verjaring van de vor-
dering van eiser tot schadevergoeding. Dit beroep 
slaagt. 
 Ingevolge  artikel 3:310 lid 1 BW , hier van toe-
passing, verjaart een rechtsvordering tot vergoe-
ding van schade door verloop van vijf jaren na de 
aanvang van de dag, volgende op die waarop de be-
nadeelde zowel met de schade als met de daarvoor 
aansprakelijke persoon bekend is geworden. 
 Met het oordeel van het EHRM dat Nederland  ar-
tikel 8 EVRM heeft geschonden, is de schending van 
een fundamenteel rechtsbeginsel gegeven, met het 
gevolg dat de Staat, mits aan de overige eisen voor on-
rechtmatige daad is voldaan, aansprakelijk is jegens 
eiser. In de stellingen van eiser ligt besloten dat het 
onrechtmatig handelen van de Staat mede is gelegen 
in een schending door de rechter (de Afdeling) van ar-
tikel 8 EVRM (onrechtmatige rechtspraak). In het licht 
van het door de Staat opgeworpen verjaringsverweer 
moet […] eiser geacht worden met de schade en de 
aansprakelijke persoon bekend te zijn geweest op het 
moment dat de Afdeling uitspraak deed. […] Dat be-
tekent dat in dat geval de verjaring is aangevangen 
op 8 december 2005 en geacht moet worden te zijn 
gestuit bij de in 2.27 genoemde brief van 22 augustus 
2008. […] Op 22 augustus 2008 is een nieuwe verja-
ringstermijn van vijf jaar aangevangen, die afliep op 
22 augustus 2013. De eerste brief waarin opnieuw 
aan de Staat wordt bericht dat aanspraak wordt ge-
maakt op schadevergoeding, dateert echter van 17 
april 2014. De vordering was toen al verjaard. 
 De conclusie van het voorgaande is dat de vor-
dering van eiser tot schadevergoeding is verjaard en 
zal worden afgewezen. 
 Vonnis in de zaak van: 
 Eiser, adv.: mr. H.F.M. Struycken te Amsterdam, 
 tegen 
 De Staat der Nederlanden (Ministerie van Veilig-
heid & Justitie), te Den Haag, gedaagde, adv.: mr. 
G.C. Nieuwland te Den Haag. 
 1  De procedure 
 1.1.  Het verloop van de procedure blijkt uit: 
 —  de dagvaarding van 12 januari 2015, 
 —  de conclusie van antwoord, met 15 producties, 
afweging in het individuele geval van genoemde 
gezichtspunten plaatsvinden. 
 3. Voor het Nederlandse bestuursrecht kan 
deze uitspraak relevant zijn bij de invulling van 
de evenredigheidsuitzondering op de beginsel-
plicht tot handhaving (vgl. ABRvS 27 februari 2013, 
 ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:BZ2533 ,  AB 2013/154 , m.nt. 
Vermeer). Als het om sloop van woningen gaat (en 
daarmee het huisrecht van  art. 8 EVRM in het ge-
ding komt), zouden de voorgaande gezichtspun-
ten daarbij door het betrokken bestuursorgaan in 
acht genomen moeten worden en zou de rechter 
daarop intensief moeten toezien. In de nationale 
beginselplichtjurisprudentie betreffen de aanvaar-
de uitzonderingen vooral gevallen waarin con-
creet zicht op legalisatie bestaat (zie Michiels in  AB 
Klassiek 2016/31 met nadere verwijzingen) en voor 
zover het gaat om de evenredigheidsuitzonderin-
gen hebben wij het beeld dat die bij uitstek aan de 
orde zijn in gevallen van kleine afwijkingen van de 
relevante bouwregels en niet zozeer vanwege de 
zeer ernstige gevolgen voor betrokkene. De hier 
opgenomen uitspraak voegt als gezegd enkele ge-
zichtspunten toe aan de te maken evenredigheids-
afweging in het individuele geval. Op deze wijze 
kunnen betrokkenen bij een handhavingsverzoek 
ten aanzien van een illegale woning over de band 
van het huisrecht van art. 8 EVRM meer bescher-
ming genieten dan via het eigendomsrecht van  art. 
1 Protocol 1 EVRM, dat bij een dergelijk handha-
vingsverzoek geen individuele afweging vergt. 
 4. Deze uitspraak is ook verschenen in 
 EHRC 2016/151, m.nt. Tjepkema. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 AB 2017/36 
 RECHTBANK DEN HAAG 
 17 februari 2016 , nr. C/09/482313 / HA ZA 15-155 
 (Mrs. J.W. Bockwinkel, W.A.G.J. Ferenschild, I. 
Brand) 
 m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 Art. 8 EVRM; art. 3:310 BW 
 ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:1579 
 Onrechtmatige overheidsdaad. Identiteitsfrau-
de. Schending  art. 8 EVRM. Geslaagd beroep op 
verjaring schadevergoedingsvordering. 
 In de onderhavige procedure stelt eiser de Staat 
aansprakelijk op grond van onrechtmatige over-
heidsdaad. Meer in het bijzonder stelt eiser, met ver-
wijzing naar de door hem gevorderde verklaringen 
voor recht en de daarbij gegeven toelichting, dat het 
Openbaar Ministerie onrechtmatig jegens hem heeft 
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